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Abstract
In many countries, inducing large-scale technological changes has
become an important policy objective, as in the context of climate
policy or energy transitions. Such large-scale changes require the de-
velopment of strongly interlinked technologies. But current economic
models have little flexibility for describing such linkages. We present
a model of induced technological change that covers a fairly large set
of cross-technology interactions and that can describe a wide variety
of long-run developments. Using this model, we analyse and compare
the development induced by optimal firm behaviour and the socially
optimal dynamics. We show that the structure of cross-technology in-
teractions is highly important. It shapes the dynamics of technological
change in the decentralised and the socially optimal solution, including
the prospects of continued productivity growth. It determines whether
the decentralised and the socially optimal solution have similar or qual-
itatively different dynamics. Finally, it is highly important for the
question whether simple r&d policies can induce efficient technological
change.
Keywords: technological spillovers; social optimality; market ineffi-
ciency; optimal control; heterogeneous innovations.
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1 Introduction
Technological progress is considered to be one of the most important drivers
of economic growth and simultaneously seen as the most appealing solution
to tackle negative side-effects of growth, such as pollution or resource de-
pletion (Jaffe et al., 2003). Consequently, many countries try to accelerate
and steer technological change via dedicated policies. During the past two
decades, policies that aim for large-scale technological change have become
widespread in industrialised countries; for example, many European coun-
tries aim to move towards a “green economy”, switching to a “sustainable
growth path”, or a “turn-around” in their energy systems.
While these aims have a clear motivation in pressing environmental prob-
lems, the resulting policies are often either rather costly, as illustrated by
the example of the German energy transition, or ineffective, as shown by
many pre-2005 national climate policies. One reason is that the process
of large-scale technological change is not well understood. In contrast to
policies in the 1960s-80s, which usually aimed at supporting one or two in-
dividual industries, such large-scale endeavours require an understanding of
how the developments of different technologies interact in order to devise
efficient policy instruments.
Somewhat surprisingly, economic theory is not well-positioned to sup-
port the development of better policy interventions. Albeit the interrelation
between the development of different technologies have long been noticed
and integrated into economic models, these models typically have a struc-
ture that makes them unappealing for modelling large-scale technological
change. Many models assume a high amount of symmetry among spillovers
between technologies. For example, endogenous growth models typically
assume that all developments contribute to public technological knowledge,
which in turn influences the development of each technology (see, e.g., Romer
(1990), Peretto and Connolly (2007), or Acemoglu and Cao (2015)).1 Other
models allow for asymmetries, but usually only in the context of a few tech-
nologies, as, for example, in Fischer et al. (2003).2
However, in many applications, we have numerous technologies together
with strong asymmetries in cross-technology interactions, where the develop-
ment of some technologies reduces development costs of other technologies,
but not vice versa. Furthermore, some technologies might only be developed
as side-effects of other technologies (direct investments being not profitable
enough), or there could be disjoint groups of technologies with strong inter-
nal but few inter-group spillovers.
1An exception is Peretto and Smulders (2002), where a model of group-specific
spillovers is introduced. However, even this model assumes full homogeneity of spillovers
within groups.
2See Jaffe et al. (2003) for an overview over similar approaches.
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In this paper, we advance and study a model of cross-technology inter-
actions that is more general than existing models regarding possible inter-
dependencies of technological developments. We first show that the model
provides a flexible tool for describing heterogeneous technology development.
Second, we relate the structure of cross-technology interactions, that is,
whether they are one- or bi-directional, similar for different technologies
or highly diverse, to the dynamics of technological change. We show that
the structure of the interactions determines whether unlimited growth of
technological quality (productivity) is feasible and whether growth is expo-
nential, linear or a mixture of both. Furthermore, we compare the dynamics
induced by individual firm decisions to the socially optimal dynamics and
show that, depending on the structure of cross-technology interactions, these
might differ not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.
Finally, we show that the problems induced by some types of cross-
technology interactions can be solved by a simple subsidising policy, whereas
other interaction structures require dynamic or highly differentiated policies.
The main insight of these results is the hitherto mostly disregarded struc-
ture of cross-technology interactions has far-reaching consequences both for
the dynamics of technological change and for the feasibility of policies that
induce efficient technological change. Indeed, it is the structure of these
interactions, not their scale, that is of highest relevance for the long-run
dynamics and the design of corrective policies. This aspect is missed almost
completely by most economic models, which use the idea of a common pool
of knowledge (i.e., perfectly homogeneous interactions between technologies)
that makes it impossible to study different structures of interactions among
technologies.
To highlight the importance of cross-technology interactions, we use a
model that is very simple apart from the interaction structure. The central
part of our model is thereby close to multi-product innovations models,
such as Lambertini (2003); Cellini and Lambertini (2002), but with a fully
dynamic approach, following Belyakov et al. (2011) and Bondarev (2012).
We study cross-technology interactions both with a finite number of tech-
nologies and a continuum of technologies, as both approaches are widely used
in economic models. However, we focus on the dynamics of technological
change in the first case, where the dynamics can be investigated in consid-
erable generality, and on the feasibility of corrective policies in the second
case, where this is a much more serious problem.
In the next section, we set up the model. In Section 3, we study the
dynamics of technological change and show how and why the decentralised
solution and a social planner’s solution diverge, first for the case of a finite
number of technologies and then for a continuum of technologies. In Section
4, we provide a few examples that highlight different aspects of the preceding
results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 A model of cross-technology interactions
Assume that a set I of R&D firms (finite or infinite) develops different
technologies that are sold in separate markets and that are used for distinct
production purposes. Each technology i ∈ I is characterised by a quality
q(i, t) ∈ R that describes the attractiveness of this technology, such as its
efficiency in production or its impact on final good quality. This measure
q(i, t) can be changed by firm i via R&D efforts g(i, t).
We assume that firm i receives a profit pi(i, t, q(i, t)) = pi0 + p¯i(i) q(i, t)
in period t that depends linearly on the quality of its technology.3 The
firm’s R&D efforts g(i, t) incur quadratic costs (1/2) g2(i, t). We assume
p¯i(i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I.
To capture technology interactions, we assume that the quality devel-
opment of each technology i consists of a part that is controlled by the
firm developing this technology and a part that results from the develop-
ment of the other technologies. Let q(t) be the vector (if I contains a finite
number of technologies) or the function (if I contains an infinite number of
technologies) of qualities of all technologies and g(t) be the corresponding
vector/function of r&d efforts. Furthermore, let γ(i) ≥ 0 be the efficiency of
the r&d efforts of firm i and γ be the vector or function of these efficiencies
for all firms.
Finally, let F be an operator acting on the space of vectors/functions of
qualities q, with a nucleus F (i, j) that describes the influence of the quality
of technology j on the development of technology i.
Given these points, we write the development of the quality of all tech-
nologies as
q˙(t) = γ g(t) + F q(t). (1)
We require F to be a linear operator on the space of vectors/functions q(t).
Thus the term F q in (1) is continuous in I and the equation is well-defined
for each t.
The operator F is the central part of our model. It can describe a va-
riety of interactions. In case of non-negative values of the nucleus, that is,
∀i, j ∈ I : F (i, j) ≥ 0,4 it describes cross-technology spillovers: Gains in
understanding one technology also enhance the quality of other technolo-
gies, as is often assumed in economic models. However, this description of
spillovers is fairly flexible. It captures the often-used idea of a general pub-
lic knowledge, where each technology contributes in the same way to the
development of all other technologies (i.e., F (i, j) = f > 0). But it also
3As the term pi0 does not influence the subsequent analysis, we assume that it is
homogeneous among firms in order to minimise notational effort. We could use pi0(i)
without any change to results.
4This implies that the operator F is positive with the norm being an operator norm,
that is, ||F|| = sup||q||≤1||Fq||.
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captures more interesting settings, such as spillovers only between nearby
technologies (F (i, j) > 0 only for i ∈ [j − ε, j + ε]), distance-dependent
spillovers (where F (i, j) declines with |j − i|), or sparse, specific spillovers
(where F (i, j) > 0 only for specific values of i, j). Also, the model can
capture asymmetric spillovers (where F (i, j) 6= F (j, i)) as well as spillover
chains (where technology i enhances technology j, which in turn enhances
technology k).
Furthermore, this approach can accommodate cases where the develop-
ment of technology i has negative effects on some other technologies. Such
cases can arise, for example, if different technologies are based on competing
sets of basic research and success in one technology shifts the direction of ba-
sic research and the education of researchers towards its underlying research
lines. As basic research and university training is often funded substantially
by public funds, this implies a negative externality among technologies. Of
particular interest are cases where the set of technologies can be separated
into subsets that are based on similar technological principles, so that there
are positive spillovers within these subsets but negative interactions between
technologies of different subsets.
In Eq. (1), F (i, i) can be interpreted as a depreciation of knowledge: If
F (i, i) < 0, it is necessary to exert some r&d effort to maintain the quality
of a technology.5 To ensure that the problem has reasonable solutions, we
assume F (i, i) < r for all i ∈ I.
Given our assumptions, firm i’s optimisation problem over an infinite
time horizon and with a discount rate r can therefore be stated as
max
g(i,t)
∫ ∞
0
e−r t
(
pi0 + p¯i(i) q(i, t)− 1
2
g2(i, t)
)
dt, (2)
s.t.
q˙(i, t) = γ(i) g(i, t) + Fi q(t), (3)
where Fi q(t) denotes the impact of all technologies on technology i implied
by the operator F .
As each firm i accounts only for the effects of its decisions on the quality
of its technology, the last term in Eq. (3) is, from this firms’ perspective,
simply a linear term F (i, i) q(i, t) plus some function of time fi(t).
As a benchmark, we also consider the social planner’s problem, who
jointly maximises the benefit of developing the different technologies. To
focus on technology interactions, instead of general externalities, we assume
that the social and the private evaluation of technological quality coincide.
Thus the social planner uses the private profit pi(i, q(i, t)) to evaluate the
quality q(i, t) of technology i at time t. The social planner’s decision problem
5Also, we could assume F (i, i) > 0 to model a case, where a higher quality of technology
i reduces the effort required to increase q(i).
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is
max
g˜(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
∫
I
(
pi0 + p¯i(i) q˜(i, t)− 1
2
g˜2(i, t)
)
di dt, (4)
s.t.
˙˜q(t) = γ g˜(t) + F q˜(t) (5)
where the tilde is used to differentiate the social planner’s decision and state
variables from the private ones. Note that the social planner optimises Eqs.
(4)–(5) w.r.t. all g(i, t), not just w.r.t. a particular technology.
For many specifications of the cross-technology interactions, problems
(2)–(3) and (4)–(5) will have differing solutions, that is, the decentralised
solution will not be socially optimal. As the two problems are otherwise
identical, the differences result solely from the cross-technology interactions.
To investigate the consequences of these interactions, it is thus interesting
to study what kind of interventions are required to correct the decentralised
solution. In this way, it is possible to differentiate different types of cross-
technology interactions with regard to how severe are the problems that
they cause.
To this end, we consider a subsidy scheme s(i, t) that increases the
marginal profit of firm i w.r.t. to quality q(i, t) at time t to p¯i(i)+s(i, t).Note
that, in general, these subsidies can differ arbitrarily between firms.
There are three ways in which the subsidy scheme can be more or less
complex. First, it can have more or less different subsidies. This is a question
of the overall complexity of the intervention. Second, it can have a finer
or coarser granularity: Subsidies could pick out single technologies or the
same subsidy could be used for similar (i.e., close-by) technologies. This is a
question as to whether enough information is available to fine-tune subsidies
to individual technologies, or whether they can be tuned only to larger sets
of technologies. Finally, a subsidy scheme can be constant over time or
require adjustments when the technologies develop.
In the most simple case, only a single subsidy that is constant over time
and that is paid to all technologies would suffice. In the most difficult case,
the social optimum can only be implemented if each technology receives a
different subsidy and these subsidies vary strongly even between close-by
technologies and over time.
To cover a range of cases, we first define a constrained subsidy scheme,
where the number of different subsidies is limited and where it is ensured
that subsidies cannot pick out single technologies.
Definition 1 (Constrained subsidy scheme).
Let M ∈ N. A subsidy scheme s(i) is of the class of constrained subsidies
SM , if it is constant in time and:
1. there exists a partitioning of I into M connected sets J1, . . . ,JM , with
s(i) being constant w.r.t. i within each set Jj, j = 1, . . . ,M ;
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2. each of these sets has a strictly positive measure in I.
By this definition, S1 is the class of constant uniform subsidies, S∞
is the class of countably many different constant subsidies, and SM with
1 < M <∞ is the class of a finite number of different constant subsidies.
Using this definition, we can define different types of policies to correct
for the externalities induced by cross-technology interactions.
Definition 2 (Types of corrective policies).
A-1 A policy is simple , if there exists a finite number M ∈ N and a subsidy
scheme s(i) ∈ SM , so that s(i) implements the social optimum;
A-2 A simple policy approximates the socially optimal solution, if there ex-
ists a sequence of subsidy schemes sk(i), k ∈ N, with sk(i) ∈ Sk, ∀k ∈ N
and with the property that limk→∞ sk(i) converges to a subsidy scheme
that implements the social optimum.
Note that there are three possibilities as to why it is impossible to correct
cross-technology interactions with a simple policy: an uncountable num-
ber of different subsidies might be required, subsidies might have to vary
strongly, even between close-by technologies, or subsidies might have to
vary over time.
In all cases, it will usually be impossible even to come close to an efficient
outcome in applications. Using a very large number of different instruments
is typically infeasible in applications, as this requires highly detailed infor-
mation and impose extreme administrative costs.6 Using subsidies that vary
strongly between close-by technologies is also difficult in practice, as tailor-
ing policies to specific technologies usually requires private information of
firms and often runs into legal problems, as apparently similar technologies
receive strongly different levels of support. Finally, using a dynamic policy
is often impossible due to administrative delays in adjusting policies and a
lack of the information that would be necessary to design a dynamic scheme
ex-ante.
3 Model solution and results
Having set up the model, we now assess its implications. In particular,
we are interested in seeing how strongly these implications differ from the
conventional common pool of knowledge setting.
6A prominent example is the feed-in tariff scheme that has been used in Germany to
support renewables till 2016. The scheme differentiated according to technology, location,
and age of an installation, using several hundred levels of subsidies in total. As the scheme
was too complex for being adjusted in time to technological changes, it caused excessive
costs and large parts of it were recently scrapped in favour of competitive tenders.
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In this conventional setting, we would have F (i, j) ≡ f > 0,∀i, j ∈ I, i 6=
j and F (i, i) ≡ β < 0∀i ∈ I. As we will show below, this setting implies
that, both in the decentralised and the social planner’s setting, technologies
experience either exponential growth (unlimited or up to a given steady
state) or exponential decay.
Furthermore, in both models, heterogeneity among technologies can only
arise via different efficiencies in research (γ(i)). If the R&D efficiency is
identical for all technologies, the qualities will converge to the same steady
state (if a steady state exists) or all technologies will experience unlimited
growth. Thus spillovers do not induce heterogeneity.
Finally, the difference between the social planner’s and the decentralised
solution can be eliminated by a subsidy s that is proportional to f , constant
over time and identical for all technologies.
Thus, this setting results in a case that has both simple dynamics and
can be solved by a simple policy intervention. We will now analyse the
implications of more complex spillovers both for the dynamics of the system
and the existence of simple policies which induce an efficient decentralised
solution. We will do this successively for the cases of a finite and an infinite
number of technologies.
3.1 Finite number of technologies
Consider first the case where I is finite, that is, we have N ∈ N/∞ firms.
Then the dynamic problem (2)-(3) is a simple linear-quadratic control prob-
lem for every firm i and the operator F has a finite rank and thus a matrix
representation F with entries Fi,j describing the influence of technology j
on technology i.
Let us first analyse the private r&d dynamics. These are given by a set
of N standard optimal control problems:
max
gi
∫ ∞
0
e−r t
(
p¯ii qi(t)− 1
2
g2i (t)
)
dt, (6)
s.t.
q˙i(t) = γi gi(t) +
N∑
j=1
Fij qj(t), . (7)
As F is a linear finite-dimensional operator, the solution to the problem is
given by the solutions of the associated canonical system of 2N equations:
ψ˙i = r ψi(t)− p¯ii − Fii ψi(t), (8)
q˙i(t) = γ
2
i ψi(t) +
N∑
j=1
Fij qj(t), (9)
lim
t→∞ e
−rt ψi = 0. (10)
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As a first step, we consider possible steady states of the system. Often,
models of technological change imply rather restrictive steady states, such
as a convergence of all qualities to a common state. The following result
shows that the above model is highly flexible in this regard.
Proposition 1. Let q¯1, q¯2, . . . , q¯N be given and assume that, for at least one
technology i ∈ I, we have γi p¯ii q¯i 6= 0 and that there is at least one other
technology j with q¯i 6= 0. Then, for any given diagonal elements of F (the
depreciation of technologies), there is a matrix F so that q¯1, q¯2, . . . , q¯N is the
steady-state of the decentralised solution.
Proof. The ODEs (8) are independent of the states qi(t) and independent
of each other. Furthermore, the optimisation problem has an infinite time
horizon with a constant discount rate r. Thus, the co-state for each i is
constant over time as a consequence of the transversality condition (10).
Under our assumption Fi,i < r, the system (8) thus has the unique solution:
ψi =
p¯ii
r − Fii → gi =
γi p¯ii
r − Fii . (11)
The Fi,i (depraciations of the technologies) are given, so that by Eq. (11),
the ψi are determined. Thus the steady state of the system (9) results from
a linear equation system
γ2i
p¯ii
r − Fii +
N∑
j=1
Fij q¯j = 0, ∀i ∈ I. (12)
This system is to be solved for the off-diagonal elements Fi,j , i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
To this end, reorder the system, so that the technology with γi p¯ii q¯i 6= 0
becomes technology 1 and the other technology with q¯j 6= 0 is technology 2.
Consider the matrix
F =

F1,1 F1,2 0 0 . . . 0
F2,1 F2,2 0 0 . . . 0
F3,1 0 F3,3 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
FN−1,1 0 . . . 0 FN−1,N−1 0
FN,1 0 . . . 0 0 FN,N

. (13)
With this structure, we can solve equation one for F1,2 and each other equa-
tion i in (12) for Fi,1 separately. Due to our assumptions, each equation has
a solution.
This proposition shows that the model is highly flexible. Even if firms
are homogenous with regard to marginal profits and r&d efficiency, there is
no limit to the heterogeneity of the steady-state.
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As a second step, we consider the dynamics. To prepare our analysis
of policy interventions, we thereby consider not only the decentralised but
also the social planner’s problem. This problem (Eqs. (4)-(5)) implies the
following dynamics
˙˜
ψi = r ψ˜i(t)− p¯ii −
N∑
j=1
Fji ψ˜j(t), (14)
˙˜qi(t) = γ
2
i ψ˜i(t) +
N∑
j=1
Fij q˜j(t), (15)
lim
t→∞ e
−rt ψ˜i = 0. (16)
The next proposition describes the optimal r&d efforts in both systems.
Proposition 2. In the decentralised solution, the firm’s r&d efforts are
constant over time, strictly positive for each firm i with γi p¯ii > 0, and zero
otherwise.
In the social planner’s solution, the r&d efforts are constant over time
if and only if the matrix Ψ˜ := r I −F T has the same rank as the augmented
matrix (Ψ˜|p¯i).
Proof. For the decentralised system, Eq. (11) already specifies the optimal
r&d efforts and proves that these are constant over time. As gi is strictly
positive if and only if p¯iigi > 0, private r&d efforts for technology i are
strictly positive if and only if p¯iigi > 0.
In the social planner’s problem, constant r&d efforts result from constant
co-states. The dynamic system (14)–(16) admits constant co-state if and
only if the system of equations
r ψ˜i − p¯ii −
N∑
j
Fji ψ˜j = 0, i ∈ I, (17)
can be solved. This is the case if and only if the matrix Ψ˜ := r I − F T has
the same rank as the augmented matrix (Ψ˜|p¯i).
This result provides an important insight. It is to be expected that
privately and socially optimal solutions differ regarding the level of r&d
efforts. However, Proposition 2 implies that they can also differ in terms of
r&d dynamics. In many cases, this will have much more profound effects on
the long-term development of technologies. Furthermore, it is much harder
to correct, as we will show below.
The result is also surprising, as it stems from a fairly simple model.
Typically, a linear-quadratic optimisation problem, such as ours, will have
simple solutions, such as, constant optimal controls (r&d efforts in our case).
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In fact, this holds in our setting without cross-technology interactions: In the
absence of such interactions, F is diagonal and (due to Fi,i < r), the matrix
Ψ˜ has full rank, so that both the decentralised and the social planner’s
problem imply constant r&d efforts. Thus Proposition 2 is indeed solely a
consequence of cross-technology interactions. As we will show in Section 4,
situations, where privately and socially optimal dynamics differ, arises easily
in plausible models.
As a third step, it is instructive to assess the dynamics in somewhat
more detail. In general, a linear-quadratic model can imply three types of
dynamics: Exponential growth/decline, (constant/dampened/intensifying)
oscillations, and linear growth or decline.
To describe how these patterns are linked to general properties of the
matrix describing the cross-technology spillovers, it is helpful to introduce
the following measure of the complexity of F : Let µaF (λi), µgF (λi) be the
algebraic and geometric multiplicities of the i-th eigenvalue of F and define
χ(F) :=
K∑
i
(µaF (λi)− µgF (λi)). (18)
With this definition, we get the following result.
Proposition 3. If F is either symmetric or triangular and in addition semi-
simple (χ(F) = 0) with all eigenvalues being non-zero, then the decentralised
dynamics consists solely of exponential growth or decline (including constant
qualities).
If F is only semi-simple (χ(F) = 0) and all eigenvalues are non-zero,
the decentralised dynamics can include both exponential growth/decline and
oscillations.
If χ(F) > 0, the decentralised dynamics can also include a product of a
linear time trend and exponential terms.
If F has eigenvalues that are zero, the decentralised dynamics will also
include an additive linear time trend.
Proof. By Prop. 2, r&d efforts gi(t) are constant and non-negative. Thus
in Eq. (7), the dynamics result solely from the matrix F , which is the Jaco-
bian matrix of the system. If F is symmetric or triangular, it has only real
eigenvalues. Furthermore, if it is semi-simple, it has no defective eigenval-
ues (eigenvalues that have a higher algebraic than geometric multiplicity)
and, by assumption, no eigenvalue is zero. Thus the dynamics are always
exponential growth or decline.
In the second assertion, we have the same situation but without symme-
try. Thus there can be complex eigenvalues, which induce oscillations.
Without semi-simplicity, there can be defective eigenvalues (F cannot
be diagonalised). In this case, dynamics can include a product of terms that
are linear in time and exponential in time.
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Finally, if at least one eigenvalue is zero, there will be an additive term
that is linear in time in addition to the other dynamics.
This proposition shows that, even in the decentralised solution, the
model encompasses a rich set of dynamics and that rather general properties
of the cross-technology interactions are sufficient to decide which dynamics
are feasible in a given system.
Most notably, the conventionally used cases of no interactions and per-
fectly homogeneous interactions (public pool of knowledge) have rather spe-
cific implications. With no interactions, F is a diagonal matrix. If none of
the diagonal elements (which are the eigenvalues in this case) is zero, we
get only exponential dynamics. With perfectly homogeneous interactions,
where each technology causes the same spillover f to all other technologies
and is depreciated at a homogeneous rate β we get the same result when-
ever f 6= β: The matrix F is semi-simple, symmetric and all eigenvalues
are non-zero. Thus under common assumptions, only the most simple dy-
namics occur in our model; more complex cross-technology interactions add
interesting dynamic structure.
The following proposition gives a similar insight for the social planner’s
problem.
Proposition 4. If Ψ˜ := r I − F T has the same rank as (Ψ˜|p¯i), Proposition
3 also holds for the social planner’s solution.
If the rank of Ψ˜ is strictly smaller than the rank of (Ψ˜|p¯i) and no eigen-
value of F equals r, the social planner’s solution always includes additive
linear dynamics for at least one technology.
If the rank of Ψ˜ is strictly smaller than the rank of (Ψ˜|p¯i) and one eigen-
value of F equals r, the social planner’s solution either adds linear dynamics
to a technology that does not have these in the decentralised solution or the
dynamics include a term that is quadratic in t for at least one technology.
Proof. By Prop. 2, rank(Ψ˜) = rank(Ψ˜|p¯i) implies constant socially optimal
r&d efforts. Thus the structure of the dynamic system (9) is the same as
that of the system analysed in Prop. 3.
If rank(Ψ˜) < rank(Ψ˜|p¯i), the system (14) implies that at least one co-
state is not constant but changes linearly with time, which implies the same
for socially optimal r&d efforts (which, following from Eqs. (4)-(5), are pro-
portional to the co-states). Thus the dynamic system (9) is non-autonomous
for at least one i ∈ I; as the first term on the r.h.s. being a linear function
of time for at least one equation.
If no eigenvalue of F is equal to r, then F + r I does not have full rank
but F has. Consequently, the dynamics implied by the system (9) have a
linear part for at least one technology. This can be easily seen by solving
the system via first solving the time-autonomous part and then using the
variation-of-constant method.
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If one eigenvalue of F is equal to r, then both F + r I and F do not have
full rank. In this case, the decentralised system already has linear dynamics
for at least one technology. Let j be a technology that has non-constant
r&d efforts in the social planner’s solution and no linear dynamics in the
decentralised solution. Let k be a technology that has linear dynamics in the
decentralised solution. If these technologies are fully separated, that is, if for
every l ∈ I with Fl,k 6= 0, we have Fj,l = 0, the non-constant r&d efforts add
linear dynamics to (at least) the technology j. If the technologies are not
fully separated or if j already has linear dynamics in the decentralised solu-
tion, the non-constant r&d efforts and the existing linear dynamics interact
and a term that is quadratic in time results.
This proposition shows that the condition of Prop. 2 is also crucial
for the quality dynamics: If rank(Ψ˜) = rank(Ψ˜|p¯i), the socially optimal
solution and the decentralised solution have the same type of dynamics.
If this condition is not met, the socially optimal solution has always more
complex dynamics. Interestingly, this can even result in dynamics that do
not exist in the decentralised system.
Another implication of Prop. 3 and 4 relates to long-run growth of
technological quality. To have unconstrained growth, it is necessary that
the dynamic system does not have a stable steady state. Our above results
shed some light on this question. First, as shown in the proofs above, the
matrix F is indeed the Jacobian of the quality dynamics (9) or (15). Thus
the eigenvalues of F govern the stability of the system, if it is autonomous.
Second, it is obvious that once the system becomes non-autonomous, it
will not have a steady state, as the non-autonomous term is additive and
independent of the states of the system.
Together, these points imply the following result.
Corollary 1. If rank(Ψ˜) = rank(Ψ˜|p¯i) and F has no eigenvalue that is zero,
the steady states of the decentralised and of the social planner’s solution have
the same stability properties (but the steady states themselves can differ).
If rank(Ψ˜) < rank(Ψ˜|p¯i), the social planner’s solution has no stable
steady state.
Proof. The first assertion is a consequence of Prop. 4 and the fact that the
Jacobian of the quality dynamics in both systems is F and thus identical.
The second assertion follows from Prop. 4, as the social planner’s solution
always has an additive non-autonomous part that is independent of q(t).
Thus, the social planner’s solution will have no stable steady state in
more cases than the decentralised solution. In other words, if unconstrained
growth occurs in the decentralised solution, it is always socially optimal.
But there are cases where unconstrained growth would be socially optimal,
but does not realise in the private solution.
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Finally, it is possible to provide some information on the prospects of
unlimited growth in the decentralised solution.
Corollary 2. Assume that Fi,i < 0 ∀ i ∈ I and Fi,j ≥ 0 ∀ i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
Then:
1. Without cross-technology interactions, the system has an asymptoti-
cally stable steady state.
2. With one-way cross-technology interactions (i.e., either Fi,j = 0∀i < j
or Fi,j = 0 ∀ i > j), the system has an asymptotically stable steady
state.
3. With homogeneous interactions (i.e., Fi,i = −β ∀ i ∈ I, Fi,j = f >
0∀ i, j ∈ I, i 6= j), there is a stable steady state if and only if f < g/N ,
where N is the number of technologies. Otherwise, there is unlimited
growth.
4. With two-way cross-technology interactions (i.e., there exist Fi,j > 0
with i < j and Fi,j > 0 with i > j), there is no stable steady state and
thus there can be unlimited growth.
Proof. In Case 1 and Case 2, the eigenvalues of the system are the diagonal
elements of F , which are all strictly negative by assumption. Thus there is
an asymptotically stable steady state.
In Case 3, the eigenvalues of the F are −f−g, which is strictly negative,
and N f − g, which is also strictly negative if and only if f < g/N . As we
only have positive spillovers, the non-existence of an asymptotically stable
steady state implies unlimited growth.
In Case 4, it is easy to find examples with strictly positive eigenvalues.
Consider, for example, a matrix F that has −g on the diagonal, Fi,j = f
whenever |i − j| = 1, and where all other entries are zero. Such a system
always has an eigenvalue of the type (α(N)f−g) with α(N) > 0 being a con-
stant that depends on the number of technologies. Thus, if f is sufficiently
larger than g. Again, this implies unlimited growth.
This corollary shows that cross-technology interactions can induce un-
limited growth in situations, where such growth would not happen without
them. This is a well-known result in endogenous growth theory (see, for
example, Smulders (1995)): Positive spillovers in non-rival knowledge cre-
ation can induce ongoing economy growth. What our result adds is some
structure: Such growth is bound to specific properties of the interactions.
It cannot happen in case of one-way interactions (chains of technological
knowledge) but requires two-way interactions. In case of a common pool of
knowledge, either the number of technologies or the spillovers have to be
sufficiently strong to induce ongoing growth.
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So far, our results have shown that cross-technology interactions can
induce fairly complex dynamics in an otherwise simple model and lead to
potentially interesting policy problems. As a final step of our analysis, we
investigate whether and how policies can bridge the gap between the decen-
tralised and the social planner’s solution.
Comparing the decentralised solution (8)–(10) and the social planner’s
solution (14)–(16) shows that both become identical, if firms in the decen-
tralised system get a subsidy that increases their profit to pi0+(p¯ii+si(t))qi(t)
with
si(t) =
N∑
j 6=i
Fji ψ˜j(t). (19)
Thus the social optimum is, in theory, implementable in the decentralised
system. But it is instructive to consider the necessary complexity of such a
scheme. The following proposition provides a first result in this regard.
Proposition 5. The subsidy scheme (19) is a simple policy in the sense of
Definition 2 if and only if rank(Ψ˜) = rank(Ψ˜|p¯i).
Proof. It is obvious that with I containing a finite number of technologies,
the only relevant constraint of Definitions 1 and 2 is that the subsidies can-
not vary over time. If rank(Ψ˜) = rank(Ψ˜|p¯i), then all ψ˜i are constant in
the social planner’s solution. Thus by Eq. (19), the subsidies are constant.
In contrast, if rank(Ψ˜) < rank(Ψ˜|p¯i), then Prop. 2 implies that r&d efforts
in the social planner’s solution vary over time but are constant in the de-
centralised solution. Thus, in this case, a set of constant subsidies cannot
correct incentives at all points of time.
This result highlights again that cross-technology interactions can have
profound effects on the dynamics of technological change and that rather
complex policies might be required to implement an efficient solution.
An interesting question left open by Proposition 5 is how complex a
”simple” policy needs to be. Our definition of a simple policy states only
that the policy can only use a finite number of different subsidies. This
will be restrictive in the setting with an uncountable number of technologies
analysed in the next section but is a fairly generous requirement in the
present setup, as each technology can be treated with a different subsidy.
Models involving the assumption of a common pool of knowledge typically
show that a single subsidy is sufficient to correct for r&d inefficiencies.
So how many different subsidies are required for different specifications?
To investigate this question, it is helpful to use some additional definitions.
Let F0 be a matrix that equals F with regard to all off-diagonal elements
but has only zeros on the diagonal, that is, F0i,j = Fi,j if i 6= j, i, j ∈ I and
F0i,i = 0∀ i ∈ I. Furthermore, let β be the vector of the Fi,i, i ∈ I. Finally,
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we use the function ∆R(X) to denote the number of different
7 rows of the
matrix X.
Using these definitions, we can provide an upper boundary to the number
of subsidies that are required to implement the socially optimal solution in
the decentralised system.
Corollary 3. Assume that rank(Ψ˜) = rank(Ψ˜|p¯i) and let nS be the number
of different, non-zero subsidies in Eq. (19). We then have
nS ≤ max{∆R(F0),∆R(p¯i) ∆R
(
(F0|β)T
)}. (20)
Proof. Note first that, with our definitions and by Prop. 5, Eq. (19) can be
written as s = F0 ψ˜, where s is the vector of subsidies si. Thus the number of
subsidies can be at most equal to the number of different elements of ψ˜ and
at most equal to the number of different rows of F0. By Eq. (17), the number
of different elements of ψ˜ is itself at most equal to the maximum of product
of the number of different elements of p¯i and the number of different rows of
the matrix (F0|β)T and the number of technologies N . As ∆R(F0) ≤ N , we
thus get Eq. (20).
To illustrate this result, let us consider two examples. Assume first that
we have homogenous interactions, that is, F (i, j) ≡ f, ∀i, j ∈ I, i 6= j and
F (i, i) = βi∀i ∈ I. In this case, the matrix F0 has always N (number of
technologies) different rows (the zero on the diagonal appears in a differ-
ent column in each row). Furthermore, without constraints on differences
between the p¯ii and βi, the second term in the maximum in Eq. (20) can
always exceed N , so that the right-hand side of (20) equals N . We might
need a different subsidy for each technology. In fact, it is easy to construct
examples where this is the case.
However, if we assume that all p¯ii and all βi are identical among firms,
the second term in the maximum in Eq. (20) equals 1. Indeed, a single
subsidy paid to all technologies suffices in this case.
As a second example, consider the following interaction matrix
F =

F1,1 0 f1 f2
0 F2,2 f1 f2
f3 f4 F3,3 0
f3 f4 0 F4,4
 . (21)
The corresponding matrix F0 (where the diagonal elements are set to zero)
has only two distinct rows (0, 0, f1, f2 and (f3, f4, 0, 0)). Thus regardless of
the assumptions on p¯ii and the Fi,i, at most two subsidies are required to
correct for this structure of cross-technology interactions, even though the
7Observe that this is the number of different rows not the number of linearly indepen-
dent rows.
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spillovers can take on four different values (f1 to f4). Note that if we switch
just two values in the matrix (21), for example, F1,2 and F4,1, we can end
up with a need for twice as many different subsidies. This neatly highlights
that it is the structure of the interactions that is important to determine
how complex a policy needs to be.
Overall, the analysis so far has shown that even in a fairly simple model,
cross-technology interactions have important consequences for the dynamics
of technological change and for the complexity of the policies required to
correct for inefficiencies. Thus accounting for these interactions and, in
particular, for the structure of these interactions, is important.
This holds even in a simple setting with a finite number of technologies.
In the next section, we consider a continuum of technologies.
3.2 Continuum of technologies
Many models of technological change use a continuum of technologies (see
Chu et al. (2012), Acemoglu and Cao (2015) for recent examples). To com-
plete our analysis, we now also cover this case.
Thus, we set I = [0, 1] ⊆ R+. As we now work in an infinite-dimensional
space, we have to be more specific regarding the cross-technology operator F .
We assume that F has an integral representation and is linear and compact.
Furthermore, in this setting we take the depreciation of a technology out of
the operator F and integrate it directly into the state equations. Thus we
have
q˙(i, t) = γ(i) g(i, t)− β(i) q(i, t) +
∫
I
F (i, j) q(j, t) dj, (22)
with ∫
I
∫
I
|F (i, j)2|didj <∞, (23)
and F (i, i) = 0∀ i ∈ I. We do not require the nucleus to be continuous over
(i, j), but only to be measurable, defined everywhere and to be a bounded
function.
Again, the firms’ optimisation problems are separated; each firm i con-
siders the influence of other technologies as a function of time f(i, t). The
optimality and transversality conditions for firm i are thus
g(i, t) = γ(i) ψ(i, t), (24)
ψ˙(i, t) = r ψ(i, t)− p¯i(i) + β(i) ψ(i, t), (25)
q˙(i, t) = γ(i) g(i, t)− β(i) q(i, t) + f(i, t), (26)
0 = lim
t→∞ e
−r t ψ(i, t). (27)
Again, we first consider possible steady states and get a result that closely
resembles Prop. 1.
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Proposition 6. Let q¯(i) be a continuous and bounded function of i ∈ I with
q¯(j) > 0 on some set J ⊆ I whose measure in I is strictly greater than zero
and where we also have γ(j) p¯i(j) > 0 for all j ∈ J .
Then, there is a continuous and bounded operator F , so that q¯(i) is the
steady state of the technological development of the decentralised system.
Proof. The conditions (24)–(27) imply
ψ(i, t) =
p¯i(i)
r + β(i)
, (28)
g(i, t) =
γ(i) p¯i(i)
r + β(i)
. (29)
Thus the steady state of the system is characterised by
γ g¯ − β q + F q = 0. (30)
Let J be the set of technologies j, for which γ(j) p¯i(j) > 0 and for which
q¯(j) > 0. By assumption, this set has a non-zero measure in I.
For each i ∈ I, we set F (i, j) = (i) for all j ∈ J , and zero otherwise.
The value of (i) is calculated from (i) = β(i) q¯(i)−γ(i) g¯(i)∫
J q¯(j) dj
. As the set J has
a non-zero measure and as q¯(j) > 0 for all j ∈ J , the conditions yields finite
values for all (j), so that F is bounded. Furthermore, the conditions ensure
that the function q¯(i) solves Eq. (30) with the constructed operator F .
Thus again, the model is highly flexible in terms of its ability to describe
long-run heterogeneity in technological quality. Note that the heterogeneity
can even occur if firms are homogeneous with regard to all parts of the model
except for the cross-technology interactions.
Again, the private r&d efforts are constant over time, as each firm con-
siders only its own technology. In contrast, the social planner’s problem
is a joint optimisation of a set of interpendent differential equation. Using
the transformation of the system into the infinite-dimensional set of ODEs
(following Belyakov et al. (2011), Skritek et al. (2014)), we can write the
optimality conditions as:
g˜(i, t) = γ(i) ψ˜(i, t), (31)
˙˜
ψ(i, t) = r ψ˜(i, t)− p¯i(i) + β(i) ψ˜(i, t)−
∫
I
ψ˜(j, t) F (j, i) dj, (32)
˙˜q(i, t) = γ(i) g˜(i, t)− β(i) q˜(i, t) +
∫
I
F (i, j) q˜(j, t) dj. (33)
with the following transversality conditions
∀i ∈ I : lim
t→∞ e
r t ψ˜(i, t) = 0. (34)
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Eq. (32) admits a constant solution ψ˜(i, t), if and only if the following
integral equation (a Fredholm equation of second kind) has a solution:
ψ˜(i) =
p¯i(i)
r + β(i)
+
1
r + β(i)
∫
I
F (j, i) ψ˜(j) dj. (35)
Together with our analysis above, this implies the following complement to
Prop. 2.
Proposition 7. In the decentralised solution, r&d efforts are always con-
stant over time. In the social planner’s solution r&d efforts are constant
over time if and only if Eq. (35) has a solution.
We thus recover the main insight of the finite dimensional case: Cross-
technology interactions can lead to a situation where the optimal solution
has structurally different dynamics than the decentralised outcome.
However, in the infinite dimensional case it is neither possible to give
necessary and sufficient conditions for the operator F so that Eq. (35) has a
solution nor is it possible to characterise the dynamics in detail, apart from
cases that are basically direct extensions of the finite dimensional case.
However, it is possible to provide some insights into how complex a
policy has to be in order to implement the socially optimal solution. In the
infinite-dimensional case, this is of much more interest than in the preceding
section, because it is obviously infeasible to have a different subsidy for each
technology. Thus the interesting question arises whether it is possible to
implement the socially optimal solution with a finite number of subsidies or,
at least, to approximate this solution.
Again, comparing the firms’ problem (Eqs. (24)–(27)) and the social
planner’s problem (Eqs. (31)–(34)) shows that the following subsidy scheme
will implement the socially optimal solution in the decentralised system:
s(i, t) =
∫
I
F (j, i) ψ˜(j, t) dj, (36)
where ψ˜(j, t) denotes the co-states in the socially optimal solution.
Without any constraints on the subsidy scheme, it is hardly surprising
that the social optimum can be decentralised. We simply provide an addi-
tional incentive to each firm, so that the firm exerts socially optimal R&D
efforts. The more interesting question is, whether a feasible subsidy scheme
is up to the task. The following proposition yields an answer.
Proposition 8. Let K ∈ N,K < ∞ and let J1,J2, . . . ,JK ⊆ [0, 1] be
disjoint connected sets that each have a measure in I that is strictly greater
than zero and whose union equals I. Define
FK(i, j) =
K∑
k=1
Pk(j)Qk(i), (37)
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where
Pk(j) =
{
1 if j ∈ Jk,
0 otherwise,
(38)
If and only if cross-technology interactions F (i, j) have the structure (37)–
(38) and Eq. (35) has a solution, the subsidy scheme (36) is a simple policy
in the sense of Def. 2.
Proof. Assume that F (i, j) has the structure (37)–(38) and Eq. (35) has a
solution. Then the optimal subsidy (36) is constant and equals
s(i) =
∫
I
ψ˜(j)
K∑
k=1
Pk(i)Qk(j) dj, (39)
=
K∑
k=1
(
Pk(i)
∫
I
ψ˜(j)Qk(j) dj
)
. (40)
By construction, for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the integral is only a function of t
and Pk(i) is either 0 or 1. Thus each element of the sum is a constant. For
each t ≥ 0, s(i, t) is therefore a piecewise constant function that takes on
at most K different values on the sets J1, . . . ,JK . Each of these sets meets
the requirements of Def. 1. Thus a simple solution s(i, t) ∈ SK exists. This
proves that the structure (37)–(38) is sufficient for the existence of a simple
solution.
Now, consider necessity. As a simple solution exists by assumption,
Eq. (35) has a solution, as a dynamic subsidy would be required otherwise.
Furthermore, there is a finite natural number K, so that s(i, t) ∈ SK . By
Definition 1, this implies that the smallest of the sets J1, . . . ,JK has a
minimal size  > 0 and is an interval (a connected subset of [0, 1]).
By Eq. (36), the optimal subsidy is given by
s(i, t) =
∫
I
ψ˜(j, t) F (j, i) dj. (41)
Consider the interval J1, which has a size of at least  > 0. On this interval,
the subsidy s(i, t) is constant w.r.t. i (by assumption). As in Eq. (41) only
F (j, i) depends on i, this implies that (j, i) is constant w.r.t. i over this
interval. Accordingly, on the interval J1, F (i, j) is a function Q1(i). Thus,
we have F (i, j) = P1(j) Q1(i) + F
R(i, j) with P1(j) as defined in Eq. (38)
and FR(i, j) being some function that is zero on J1.
Repeating this procedure for all other intervals J2, . . . ,JK leads to F (i, j) =∑K
k=1 Pk(j) Qk(i) + F
R(i, j) with the Pk(j) being given by Eq. (38). As
∪Kk=1Jk = I, the function FR(i, j) needs to be zero everywhere on I. Thus,
we get the characterisation of F (i, j) given in Eqs. (37)–(38). The proper-
ties of the sets stated in Proposition 8 are directly inherited from Definition
1.
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Proposition 8 shows that highly specific assumptions are necessary to
ensure that cross-technology interactions cause problems that can be solved
by a simple subsidy scheme. It is necessary that technologies can be grouped
into a finite number of sets, where all technologies in a set Ji cause the
same spillover.8 In Section 4, we will show that this is indeed a rather
restrictive assumption; even if we form blocks of technologies that cause
constant spillovers to other technologies (which is one of the simplest possible
structures apart from fully homogeneous interactions), these blocks have to
have a specific form.
Thus the ubiquitous model of a common pool of knowledge describes
a rather non-generic case. In most more general cases, we have to expect
that technology interactions will cause problems that cannot be solved with a
simple policy. Thus, in most applications, we have to expect that the process
of technological change will not lead to a socially optimal outcome, with or
without state interventions. Note further that this is not a transitory but
rather a persistent problem: The long-run qualities arising from privately
optimal investments do not converge to the socially optimal long-run quality
levels.
This result highlights an important point: If a regulatory authority either
does not have the necessary information to use policy interventions that
are tailored to specific technologies or is not able to yield a high number of
different instruments, R&D subsidies are not sufficient to cope with complex
situations of cross-technology interactions. As discussed in the introduction,
we face increasingly complex problems of technological change. Thus it
appears likely that efficient technology transitions will be more a theoretical
benchmark than an achievable outcome.
However, even if an efficient solution cannot be attained, it might be
possible to come close to it. In our setting, this corresponds to the question
whether a simple approximate solution exists. To gain insight into this
question, we use the following definition.
Definition 3. The cross-technology interactions F have at least a minimal
regularity, if there exists an  > 0 so that the technology space I can be
partitioned into a number of disjoint, connected sets of minimal size  with
F (i, j) being a.e. continuous on each of these sets.
This condition effectively demands that, except for a countable number
of technologies, each technology has some close-by technology that causes
similar effects on the development of all other technologies. In other words,
there is some minimal regularity as to how interactions change across the
set of technologies.
8This spillover can vary w.r.t. the receiving technology, but the way in which it varies
has to be identical for all technologies in Ji.
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As the following proposition shows, this definition is a good indicator
for the question, under which conditions, we can find simple approximate
solutions.
Proposition 9. A simple policy can approximate the socially optimal solu-
tion if and only if F has minimal regularity in the sense of Def. 3 and Eq.
(35) has a solution.
Proof. Assume that F has minimal regularity and Eq. (35) has a solution.
Then, for every i ∈ I, there is at most a countable number of points at
which F (i, j) is not continuous. Consequently, F (i, j) is a.e. continuous.
In this case, Eq. (35) implies that ψ¯S is also a.e. continuous, so that the
optimal subsidy (36) has the same property.
As the optimal subsidy is a.e. continuous w.r.t. i, it can be approxi-
mated to an arbitrary precision by the step-wise function that constitutes a
constrained subsidy according to Definition 1:∫
I
(
s(i)− sM (i)) di = ∫
I
s(i) di−
M∑
d=1
Ad(id − id−1) M→∞→ = 0, (42)
where
Ad =
∫ id
id−1
s(i) di
id − id−1 (43)
is the average value of s(i) over the subset Jd from Definition 1.
If F does not have minimal regularity, then there is an uncountable
number of points at which F is not continuous and, by the above argument,
the same holds for the optimal subsidy s(i). The function s(i) thus has
an uncountable number of discontinuities, so that no countable number of
subsidies can approximate the optimal s(i) in the sense of Def. 2.
If Eq. (35) does not have a solution, a dynamic subsidy is required to
approximate the optimal solution.
This result provides a far more optimistic picture regarding the prospects
of interventions then Proposition 8. It shows that, as long as technology in-
teractions originating from close-by technology have similar effects in almost
all cases, an efficient outcome can at least be approximated by a feasible pol-
icy. By increasing the number of subsidies, we can get arbitrarily close to
the socially optimal solution. Note that this result is not trivial, as we have
an uncountable number of technologies but restrict the policy to a countable
number of instruments.
However, it is obvious that there is a substantial class of problems in
which even a simple approximate solution is not achievable. We will provide
an example in Section 4. In general terms, this holds when many (an un-
countable number) of isolated technologies cause the spillovers. An example
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are situations, where out of groups of different technologies (such groups
could, e.g., be wind power, PV, geothermal energy), only single technologies
(e.g., a particular type of PV cell) cause a spillover. In such cases, a feasible
policy (that addresses a group of technologies, such as, PV) will not be able
to induce an efficient outcome.
Overall, the analysis in this section has shown two main points. First, a
generalisation of the commonly used model of cross-technology interactions
appears to be useful. The generalised model has a far greater scope to
describe eventual outcomes of technological change (in terms of the steady-
state distribution of technological qualities). Furthermore, the situation
depicted by the model of a common pool of knowledge is non-generic in that
it is much too optimistic regarding the prospects of solving the problems
caused by cross-technology interactions. Simple solutions can only be found
in very special cases and it is not even possible to approximate the social
optimum with feasible policy in all cases.
4 Examples
To highlight the most important results of the preceding sections and to
show the range of applicability of the model, we give some examples.
4.1 Example 1: One-way interactions with a finite number
of technologies
Let us start with one-way technological interactions in a finite-dimensional
setting: The technologies can be ordered in a way, so that each technology
receives only a spillover from preceding technologies and never from suc-
ceeding ones. In this case, the interactions can be described by a triangular
matrix, so that we have
F =

F1,1 0 0 . . . 0
F2,1 F2,2 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
...
FN−1,1 . . . FN−1,N−2 FN−1,N−1 0
FN,1 . . . FN,N−2 FN,N−1 FN,N
 . (44)
The eigenvalues of such a matrix are given by the diagonal elements, which
we assume all to be strictly negative. Assume further that each technology
(apart from technology 1) receives at least one spillover, that is, for all
i > 1, there is at least one j < i, so that Fi,j 6= 0. In this case, the geometric
multiplicity of each eigenvalue is always one. We assume that all spillovers
are non-negative.
Thus, if the Fi,i all differ from each other, the matrix is semi-simple
(all eigenvalues having an algebraic and geometric multiplicity of one). By
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Prop. 3, we thus get exponential dynamics in the decentralised system.
Furthermore, by Cor. 2, the decentralised system has an asymptotically
stable steady state, so that there is no option for continued growth.
If at least two Fi,i coincide (technologies having the same rate of depre-
ciation in quality), the matrix is no longer semi-simple and the system can
thus include a term that is a mixture of linear and exponential terms. How-
ever, as the exponential terms always dominate in the long run, the system
still has an asymptotically stable steady state.
In all these cases, F has full rank. Furthermore, owing to the assumption
Fi,i < 0, the matrix F − r I also has full rank. Thus the social planner’s
solution always has the same type of dynamics as the decentralised solution
and a simple solution (a finite number of constant subsidies) will implement
the socially optimal outcome in the decentralised system.
As we mainly assumed that the cross-technology interactions have a
specific structure (being one-way interactions) without severely limiting con-
straints on the relative magnitude of the interactions, these conclusions have
a considerable range of application.
Figure 1 provides a numerical example for three technologies. Here,
each technology causes a positive spillover to the next technology. The
first two technologies are easily developed but not very profitable. The
third technology is more profitable, but direct r&d has a small efficiency.
In this setting, the social planner would maintain the quality of the first
technology, strongly develop the second one and thereby induce development
of the third technology. This does not happen in the decentralised solution,
where all technologies stabilise on a much lower quality level. To correct for
this, three constant but different subsidies are required. In the numerical
example, we get s1 ≈ 0.2, s2 ≈ 0.55, s3 ≈ −20.8; the social planner thus
actively discourages the direct development of technology 3, because indirect
development via spillovers from technology 2 is much less costly.
4.2 Example 2: A continuum of technologies with homoge-
nous interactions between groups of technologies
As a second example, consider a simple setting with a continuum of tech-
nologies. In such a setting, it is usually impossible to obtain closed-form
solutions. Thus, we only characterise special settings, where simple policies
can (approximately) correct the r&d externalities. To this end, we consider
interactions that are contained to groups of technologies and are homoge-
neous within these groups. Again, this is a setting with many potential
applications.
Assume that there is a finite numberK of closed, connected sets S1,S2, . . . ,SKI×
I, so that interactions between technologies i and j take on a constant value
fk, if there is some k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} so that (i, j) ∈ Sk or zero, otherwise. If
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Figure 1: : Example with three technologies: r = 5%, F1,1 = F2,2 = F3,3 =
−25%, (1/2) F2,1 = F3,2 = 10%, all other Fi,j = 0, p¯i1 = p¯i2 = 1, p¯i3 = 25,
γ1 = γ2 = 1, γ3 = 1/25, q1(0) = 100, q2(0) = 50, q3(0) = 0. Bold lines
depict the social planner’s solution, dashed lines the decentralised ones.
each of these sets is placed along the diagonal,9 we have the above special
case of interactions within groups of technologies. Otherwise, we have a
more general form of interaction.
Define the boundary of the set Sk as a function within the technology
space:
∆k : ik = fk(j). (45)
We characterise our setting in terms of these boundaries.
Corollary 4. Assume interactions are uniform within closed connected sets
Sk with k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, K < ∞ and zero across sets. In addition assume
∆k is a closed curve for all k. Then:
1. If ∆k for all k ∈ K is a piecewise-constant function of j over intervals
of size  > 0, the nuclei of F ,F∗ are finitely generated and a simple
policy can implement the socially optimal solution in the decentralised
system.
2. If there exists some kˆ ∈ K such that ∆kˆ is convex and nowhere
piecewise-constant,10 a simple policy can approximate the socially op-
timal solution in the decentralised system.
9That is, if (i, j) ∈ Sk, then (i, i) ∈ Sk and (j, j) ∈ Sk.
10Note that strict convexity is stronger than this requirement: we allow for straight
lines, but not for those implying i = const or j = const.
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Proof. Under the conditions of Assertion 1, all sets Sk can be partitioned
into a finite collection of disjoint, rectangular sets with a size not smaller
than  × . By (36), s(i) can take on only a finite number of values. This
implies F (i, j) is degenerate and F ,F∗ are of finite rank, so that Prop. 8
applies.
In the context of Assertion 2, sets are convex. Thus s(i) cannot be
piecewise-constant, even for uniform interactions over a finite number of
sets. But it is a.e. continuous, because interactions are constant within each
set, the number of sets is finite, and, due to convexity, each set intersects
only twice with a line j and thus can cause at most two discontinuities. In
this case, Proposition 9 applies.
This result shows that, for the case of constant interactions between sets
of technologies, the boundaries of these sets play a decisive role. If these
boundaries facilitate a decomposition of the set into rectangular subsets, the
problem is of the simplest possible class: A simple solution can be found.
The reason is that, in this case, not only the size of individual spillovers but
also the number of technologies getting the spillover is locally constant.11
Thus close-by technologies usually cause the same spillovers to the same set
of other technologies. Thus the externality can be solved successfully with
a finite number of different subsidies.
If the boundaries are more complex (i.e., we have convex sets without
vertical or horizontal boundaries), the number of technologies that receive
a spillover will usually vary, even between close-by technologies. Thus the
subsidy has to vary as well. However, the subsidy will vary continuously
(almost everywhere) and can thus be at least approximated by a simple
subsidy scheme.
For both cases, it is possible to calculate the subsidy explicitly. Assume
that there are K disjoint compact rectangular subsets Sk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
of [0, 1], where we have, for each subset Sk,
F (i, j) =
{
f¯k, if i, j ∈ Sk,
0, otherwise.
(46)
This resembles Case 1 of Corollary 4.12 The optimal subsidy scheme consists
of a finite number of different subsidies related to the sets Sk with k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}
sk(t) = f¯k
∫ j¯k
j
k
ψ¯S(j) dj, (47)
11It varies only rarely, that is, a countable number of times.
12By combining the disjoint, rectangular set to larger sets, we get the sets described in
Case 1.
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where j
k
and j¯k denote the lower and upper boundary of set k, respectively.
The subsidy for technology i at time t is simply the sum of all the
subsidies for all sets k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} that contain technology i:
s(i) =
K∑
k=1
{
sk(t) if ∃j ∈ I so that (j, i) ∈ Sk,
0, otherwise.
(48)
This subsidy takes on only a finite number of different values, so that it is
a simple policy according to Definition 1.
For Case 2 of Corollary 4, the subsidy is calculated in the same way, only
we get instead of (47)
sk(i) = f¯k
∫ j¯k(i)
j
k
(i)
ψ¯S(j) dj, (49)
where the upper and lower boundaries are now functions of i, so that the
set-specific subsidy sk(i) is also a function of i. As the upper and lower
boundaries are continuous functions of i and as there are only finitely many
sets K, the subsidy is a.e. continuous. It can thus be approximated by a
step-wise function in the sense of Definition 2.
4.3 Example 3: Special cases with specific dynamics
So far, our examples have covered only cases with fairly simple dynamics. As
a final example, we consider settings that generate more interesting dynam-
ics. To keep the exposition brief, we constrain ourselves to two technologies,
which implies that the examples have to be rather specific to generate com-
plex dynamics.
Consider first a setting with F1,1, F2,2 < 0 and F1,2 > 0, F2,1 < 0. Thus
technology 2 causes a positive spillover on technology 1, which, in turn, has
a negative effect on technology 2. As Plot (a) in Figure 2 shows, this setting
can cause oscillatory dynamics. However, the decentralised and the social
planner’s solution still have similar dynamics (albeit the oscillations differ
both with regard to amplitude and phase).
As a final example, we thus consider a case where the matrix rI−F T does
not have full rank. Thus, the social planner’s dynamics have a qualitatively
different structure than the decentralised dynamics. An example is given
in Plot (b) in Figure 2. There, the dynamics in the decentralised system
consist of an exponential part, whereas the social planner’s dynamics include
a linear and an exponential part.
To correct for these differences, a dynamic subsidy is necessary. Note
that, in this example, there is no stable steady state, both technologies will
have unlimited quality growth.13 However, the social planner’s solution will
13This is solely due to the spillovers: Without them the system would converge to a
steady state at q1(∞) = 120, q2(∞) = 5000/3.
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(a) F1,1 = −1/3, F2,2 = −1/6, F1,2 =
13/30, F2,1 = −13/60, γ1 = γ2 = 1,
p¯i1 = 20, p¯i2 = 10, r = 5%, q1(0) = 0,
q2(0) = 200.
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(b) F1,1 = −1/20, F2,2 = −1/100,
F1,2 = 3/50, F2,1 = 1/10, γ1 = 3/10,
γ2 = 1, p¯i1 = 2, p¯i2 = 1, r = 5%,
q1(0) = 500, q2(0) = 250.
Figure 2: Numerical calculations for example 3. Bold lines depict the social
planner’s solution, dashed lines the decentralised outcome.
rely on costless spillovers to a much larger extent than the firms, so that
growth in the social optimum is slower at the beginning.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the effect of cross-technology interactions in
r&d on the development of technologies. We have advanced a model that
describes interactions among technologies that is considerably richer than
existing models. We have shown that the model can cover a wide range
of long-run outcomes but is nevertheless structured enough to gain some
insights into the effects of cross-technology interactions. In particular, we
have provided a number of results that show how the structure of cross-
technology interactions influences the dynamics of technological change and
characterised settings in which the decentralised dynamics differ qualita-
tively from the socially optimal ones.
In addition, we have analysed whether a sufficiently simple, and thus
potentially implementable, subsidising policy can correct r&d incentives.
Again, our results have shown that it is the structure of interactions, not
their scale, that determines whether efficient technological change can be
achieved by simple means or not.
Our results cover both the case of a finite set and of a continuum of
technologies albeit with different foci, as these cases have a strongly differing
tractability and different consequences for the feasibility of policies.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the structure of cross-
technology interactions is relevant, if the dynamics of technological change
are to be understood and r&d policies are to be designed. The widely used
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assumption of a common pool of knowledge is too simple and thus misses
important aspects of the problems induced by r&d spillovers.
For example, if technologies form a ”chain of knowledge”, where each
technology has only effects on subsequent technologies, different dynam-
ics and policy problems arise than in cases of bi-directional interactions.
Similarly, a setting where interactions are homogenous within subgroups of
technologies has drastically different policy implications than a setting with
more heterogenous interactions. To the best of our knowledge, the structure
of cross-technology interactions has so far not been related to the dynamics
of technological change or the complexity required for efficient r&d policies.
The trend towards policies aiming to induce broader technology shifts,
such as climate and energy policies that aim to replace fossil fuels by renew-
ables, digitisation of whole sectors, or large-scale changes to the mobility
system, emphasise that understanding connected technological changes is
highly important.
The paper provides a first step in this direction. As the model has
deliberately been kept simple to focus the analysis on the effects of cross-
technology interactions, it is far from being directly applicable. Rather,
it should be seen as an argument that cross-technology interactions have
important implications that warrant further study.
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